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THE COST OF EVIDENCE:  EXAMINING THE FDA’S 
TREATMENT OF CRITICALLY-NEEDED DRUGS FROM 
AN EX ANTE PERSPECTIVE 
JULIE DORAIS* 
INTRODUCTION 
“Substantial evidence” may be the two costliest words in the Food Drug 
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).   Congress first introduced the term in 1962 as a 
part of the Kefauver amendments to the FDCA.1   In addition to requiring 
premarketing approval of new drugs for the first time, it requires sponsors 
to provide “substantial evidence” of a new drug’s effectiveness in order to 
obtain the necessary approval.2  As a result, the cost and length of time for 
drug development immediately skyrocketed in 1962 and continues to rise to 
this day.3 
However, the cost of the “substantial evidence” requirement is not simp-
ly the estimated $2 billion it takes to bring a drug to market.4   The re-
quirement also brought about two secondary costs—delayed access to criti-
cally-needed therapies and disincentives to develop drugs with small mar-
ket potential.5  Accordingly, it is not insurance companies, drug manufac-
turers, or consumers who feel the costs of the “substantial evidence” re-
quirement most acutely, but patients with serious conditions and without 
                                                                                                                           
 *  Julie Dorais graduated with a JD/MPH from Harvard Law School and Harvard School of 
Public Health, now Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, in May 2013.  This article is adapted 
from a paper written at Harvard Law School for Professor Peter Barton Hutt’s class, Food & Drug Law.  
 1. Linda Katherine Leibfarth, Giving the Terminally Ill Their Due (Process): A Case for Expand-
ed Access to Experimental Drugs Through the Political Process, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1287 (2008). 
 2. Benjamin R. Rossen, FDA’s Proposed Regulations to Expand Access to Investigational Drugs 
for Treatment Use: The Status Quo in the Guise of Reform, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 183, 185 (2009). 
 3. See Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of A New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 424 (2010). 
 4. Cost estimates vary widely, and their accuracy and comparability are hotly debated.  Evans, 
supra note 3, at 424. Estimates from other studies range from $500 million to $2 billion. Id. at 424  
(citing Comm. on the Assessment of the U.S. Drug Safety Sys., Inst. of Med., THE FUTURE OF DRUG 
SAFETY 32 (Alina Baciu et al. eds., 2007).  According to a study conducted by the Tufts Center for the 
Study of Drug Development, the average cost of developing a drug in 2005 was $1.3 billion dollars in 
2000 U.S. dollars. Avik Roy, Stifling New Cures: The True Cost of Lengthy Clinical Drug Trials, Pro-
ject FDA Report No. 5 April 2012, at 1. 
 5. See Leibfarth, supra note 1, at 1287. 
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any available therapy.  Patients with serious orphan diseases often fit this 
description. 
Congress and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are clearly aware 
of this fact and have attempted to address the problems by allowing ex-
panded access to unapproved therapies under qualified circumstances and 
by providing orphan drug sponsors with financial incentives through the 
Orphan Drug Act.  However, given the limits of these two measures, the 
FDA also utilized a third method—flexibly interpreting the “substantial 
evidence” requirement to effectively reduce the evidentiary requirements 
for many such drugs.  However, it has not consistently done so, nor has it 
provided any reliable indication of whether, or to what extent, a reduced 
standard would apply.  If a sponsor cannot judge ahead of time that a re-
duced standard will apply to its drug, it has no incentive to develop drugs 
with expected low revenues.  Because post-hoc flexibility does not ade-
quately address ex ante incentives, Congress and the FDA must adjust evi-
dentiary standards in order to encourage the development of critically-
needed drugs. 
Part I of this paper will address the articulated “substantial evidence” re-
quirement, and Part II will discuss the FDA’s approach of adjusting the 
standard on a case-by-case basis.  Part III will discuss two indirect ways 
that Congress and the FDA attempt to counter the secondary harms of the 
requirement, namely, through expanded access and the Orphan Drug Act, 
and the incomplete success of these reforms.  Part IV will discuss the rea-
sons for reducing evidentiary standards for critically needed drugs, and Part 
V will discuss why clarifying this adjustment is critical from an ex ante 
perspective. 
PART 1. THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT 
1. The Gold Standard: Background 
Under the FDCA, any entity that intends to market a new drug in the 
U.S. must first convince the FDA, with “substantial evidence” from “ade-
quate and well-controlled investigations,” that the drug is effective under 
conditions of use specified in the label.6  This, in a nutshell, is the “substan-
tial evidence” requirement.7  As Congress defined “substantial evidence” in 
                                                                                                                           
 6. The term “substantial evidence” applies only to evidence establishing efficacy.  For evidence 
of safety, the statute requires “adequate tests by all methods reasonably applicable to show whether or 
not such drug is safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the pro-
posed labeling thereof,” and that the “results of such tests” must show “such drug is safe for use under 
such conditions.” See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(d). 
 7. Although this paper will use the term “drugs,” most of the discussion applies to biologics as 
well as drugs.  The “substantial evidence” requirement in § 355(d) technically applies to drugs and not 
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broad terms, the FDA has borne the primary responsibility for determining 
exactly what this means in practice.8 
To ultimately satisfy the “substantial evidence” requirement, the typical 
drug candidate must navigate a lengthy, expensive process.9  Before a spon-
sor may test a drug on humans, it must engage in extensive preclinical test-
ing of the drug and include this information in an investigational new drug 
application (IND).10  Only after the FDA approves the IND may the sponsor 
begin clinical, or human, testing.11  Typically, pre-approval clinical testing 
occurs in three phases.12  In Phase I, the drug is administered to about 20-80 
participants, usually healthy volunteers, with the purpose of learning how 
the drug pharmacologically operates in humans and to identify any adverse 
events. 13  Phase II trials are typically conducted on a few hundred partici-
pants who have the disease of interest, usually over the course of several 
months,14 to provide preliminary evidence of efficacy and identify any 
short-term side effects or risks.15 
However, it is the Phase III trials that usually qualify as the “adequate 
and well-controlled investigations” referenced in the statute,16 which in turn 
serve as the “the primary basis” for satisfying the substantial evidence re-
                                                                                                                           
biologics. (See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262 and 21 C.F.R. §§ 600.20 - 600.90 for the treatment of biologics.)  
However, the FDA maintains that the same effectiveness requirement applies to pharmaceuticals and 
drugs composed of biological compounds. In practical application, different standards may actually be 
applied.  Jennifer Kulynych, Will FDA Relinquish the “Gold Standard” for New Drug Approval? Rede-
fining “Substantial Evidence” in the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 127, 137-
38 (1999). 
 8. Evans, supra note 3, at 423-425.  Under the statute, “substantial evidence” is “evidence con-
sisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by [qualified] 
experts…, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded by such experts that the 
drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, 
recommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof.” See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(d). 
 9. Although many of the procedural requirements may be considered independent of the substan-
tial evidence requirement itself, the process consists of various evidentiary hurdles that a sponsor must 
satisfy before ultimately convincing the FDA that a drug is safe and effective for its intended use. See 11 
C.F.R. §§ 312.20-312.38. 
 10. Rossen, supra note 2, at 185. See also 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(8) (2014) (requiring “adequate 
information about pharmacological and toxicological studies of the drug” through animal and/or in vitro 
studies, to allow the sponsor to “conclude[] that it is reasonably safe to conduct the proposed clinical 
investigations”). 
 11. § 312.20(b). 
 12. § 312.21 (stating that “[t]he clinical investigation of a previously untested drug is generally 
divided into three phases”) (italics added). 
 13. See § 312.21(a). 
 14. Michael J. Malinowski & Grant G. Gautreaux, Drug Development-Stuck in A State of Puber-
ty?: Regulatory Reform of Human Clinical Research to Raise Responsiveness to the Reality of Human 
Variability, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 363, 376 (2012). 
 15. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b) (2014) (defining Phase II studies as “controlled clinical studies conduct-
ed to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug for a particular indication or indications in patients with the 
disease or condition under study and to determine the common short-term side effects and risks associ-
ated with the drug”). 
 16. Malinowski & Gautreaux, supra 14, at 378. 
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quirement.17  The FDA typically invokes what is now called the “gold 
standard” to determine whether a trial is “adequate and well-controlled.”18  
It describes aspects of this standard through regulations and guidance, while 
reserving for itself discretion to depart from it.19  Under the gold standard, a 
sponsor should present statistically significant results from each of two 
Phase III randomized controlled trials (RCTs).20  The study should utilize 
“clinical endpoints,” which means that the drug must have a statistically 
significant effect upon the clinical outcome of interest.21  A typical Phase 
III trial is conducted on thousands of participants across multiple sites and 
takes about 1-4 years.22 
To show statistically significant effects on clinical endpoints in two sepa-
rate trials, sponsors require large sample sizes and, in turn, a large financial 
investment.23  Not surprisingly, the cost of drug development immediately 
began to skyrocket after 1962.24  According to a recent study, the average 
cost of developing a drug was $1.3 billion in 2005,25 and the current cost 
may be far higher.26 
                                                                                                                           
 17. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(a) (2014) (“Reports of adequate and well-controlled investigations pro-
vide the primary basis for determining whether there is ‘substantial evidence’ to support the claims of 
effectiveness for new drugs.”). 
 18. Leibfarth, supra note 1, at 1285. 
 19. See Kulynych, supra note 7, at 129 (noting that the FDA makes use of regulations and guid-
ance to “describ[e] the necessary attributes of an “adequate and well-controlled” clinical trial,” that the 
“regulations appear to incorporate … the agency’s ‘gold standard’ for demonstrating ‘substantial effec-
tiveness,” but that it permits “certain modifications” from these specifications). 
 20. FDA, Guidance for Industry: Providing Evidence of Effectiveness for Human Drug and Bio-
logical Products, May 15, 1998, at 3 [hereinafter Guidance].  Statistical significance with a p-value < 
0.05 means that, assuming there is no association in fact, there is less than a 5% chance of erring in 
finding an association.  Joseph W. Cormier, Advancing FDA’s Regulatory Science Through Weight of 
Evidence Evaluations, 28 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 9 (2011). 
 21. Russell Katz, Biomarkers and Surrogate Markers: An FDA Perspective, 1 NEURORX 189, 190 
(2004) (noting that, “in practice,” the FDA only approve drugs if they show “manifest effects on the 
clinical signs and/or symptoms of the disease for which they are intended as treatments,” even though 
this does not necessarily follow from “a strict reading” of the statutory definition of “substantial evi-
dence”). 
 22. Malinowski & Gautreaux, supra note 14, at 376; Evans, supra note 3, at 446. 
 23. Even if the drug has an effect, a study would not have a good chance of reporting a p-value 
<0.05 unless it has adequate power, which, in practical terms, means that the sample size must be suffi-
ciently large.  Power is not only affected by the sample size but by the event rate; if a longer trial cap-
tures more events, it would have greater power, all else equal. See Kenneth Schulz & David Grimes, 
Sample Size Calculations in Randomised Trials: Mandatory And Mystical, 365 LANCET 1348, 1348-49 
(2005). Accordingly, the requirement for clinical endpoints also leads to high costs and lengthy trials, 
since, the more infrequent the outcome of interest, the greater the required sample size and time. See Id. 
at 1349-50. 
 24. Evans, supra note 3, at 424. 
 25. The study was conducted by the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, and the 
figures are in 2000 U.S. dollars. See Roy, supra note 5, at 1. 
 26. See supra, note 9. 
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2. FDA Regulations 
However, it is worth noting that the law does not actually demand this 
high standard.  The regulations do not require the use of concurrent con-
trols, a showing of statistical significance, or even Phase III trials.27  Rather, 
the regulations elaborate upon certain characteristics that are the “essentials 
of an adequate and well-controlled clinical investigation,” which the FDA 
“considers” in deciding whether a particular investigation qualifies as 
such.28   While placebo controls or dose-comparison concurrent controls 
may be preferable, the FDA recognizes that a study using only historical 
controls may qualify as an “adequate and well-controlled trial” under cer-
tain circumstances.29 
The regulations assert some minimal requirements.  For one, they explic-
itly state that “uncontrolled studies or partially controlled studies are not 
acceptable as the sole basis for the approval of claims of effectiveness,” and 
they will only be considered in conjunction with well-controlled studies.30  
However, for the most part, the regulations are carefully worded to allow 
significant room for flexibility.31 
3. The Official Response to the Secondary Costs  of the “Substantial Evi-
dence” Requirement 
A. The FDA’s Reforms 
As the secondary costs of the “substantial evidence” became evident, the 
FDA soon found it necessary to exercise this flexibility.  The early 1980s 
marked the beginning of the AIDs epidemic in the U.S.32  In the mid-1980s, 
Dr. David Broder discovered that the compound AZT demonstrated anti-
viral activity against the poorly-understood AIDs virus; however, by that 
time, the typical drug approval process already took 8 years.33  Facing sig-
nificant pressure from activists, the FDA decided to substantially speed the 
                                                                                                                           
 27. The regulations recognize five types of controls, including historical controls and “no treat-
ment concurrent controls.” See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2)(i-v). Also, while FDA regulations recognize 
that trials “generally” occur in the three phases, it does not explicitly require Phase III trials. See § 
312.21. 
 28. § 314.126(a). 
 29. § 314.126(b)(2)(v). 
 30. § 314.126(e). 
 31. § 314.105(c) (stating, “While the statutory standards apply to all drugs, the many kinds of 
drugs that are subject to the statutory standards and the wide range of uses for those drugs demand 
flexibility in applying the standards.”) 
 32. Leibfarth, supra note 1, at 1282. 
 33. Donna A. Messner, Rulemaking under Fire: Accelerated Approval as a Case Study of Crisis-
Mode Rulemaking 8-9 (Georgia Inst. of Technology, School of Public Policy, Working Paper, April 27, 
2006). 
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approval process for AZT.34  After a Phase I trial reported a small but statis-
tically significant effect upon a biomarker in each of the nineteen subjects, 
the researchers proceeded to conduct a placebo-controlled Phase II trial, 
which they were able to stop after 4 months based on the positive interim 
results.  A few months afterwards, the FDA approved the drug on the con-
dition that the sponsor conducted a post-marketing study.35  Not long after, 
the FDA approved ddI for the treatment of AIDs based solely on “Phase I-
II” trials that used historical controls and surrogate endpoints.36 
The FDA essentially “codified” these approval stories through the Sub-
part E and Subpart H regulations.37   Written in permissive language, Sub-
part E essentially clarifies that the FDA could apply the same standards and 
procedures used in the AZT approval for new drugs intended to treat “life-
threatening or severely-debilitating diseases,” 38 although it did not obligate 
it to do so.39  Subpart H, or the “accelerated approval regulations,” similarly 
applies to drugs intended to treat “serious or life-threatening illnesses and 
that provide meaningful therapeutic benefit to patients over existing treat-
ments.”40  Importantly, it permits the FDA to approve an NDA based on the 
drug’s apparent effect on a “surrogate endpoint,” an intermediate variable 
that points to the clinical outcome.41  This allows researchers to conduct 
smaller trials with the same statistical power, reducing both time and cost.42 
In 1997, Congress incorporated much of Subpart H into statute under the 
“fast track” provisions in the Food and Drug Administration Modernization 
                                                                                                                           
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 9-10. 
 36. Id. at 14-15. 
 37. Id. at 12-13. 
 38. In the publication of the regulations, the FDA explicitly acknowledges that Subpart E was 
loosely modeled after the details in the AZT approval story.  Id. at 12-13 (citing 53 Fed. Reg. 41516-
41524 (21 Oct. 21, 1988)).  . 
 39. Even if the mechanisms of Subpart E applied, a sponsor could not know ahead of time whether 
Phase III trials would ultimately be required.  A sponsor “may request” early meetings with the FDA, 
including an end-of-Phase I meeting to agree on the design of Phase II stud(ies) that may possibly quali-
fy as “adequate and well-controlled studies.” 21 C.F.R. § 312.82 (2014).  However, following conclu-
sion of the Phase II stud(ies), the FDA will use a “medical risk-benefit judgment,” still applying the 
“statutory standards for marketing approval,” to decide “whether the benefits of the drug outweigh the 
… risks.” § 312.83. The FDA may conclude that the Phase II data is inadequate, notwithstanding adher-
ence to a design that resulted from an end-of-Phase I meeting. See § 312.84(c). 
 40. § 314.500. 
 41. § 314.510. 
 42. The more infrequent the outcome of interest, the greater the required sample size and time. See 
Schultz & Grimes, supra note 23, at 1349-50. The provision for surrogate endpoints is therefore particu-
larly important for life-saving therapies because the clinical endpoint for such drugs is mortality.  Mi-
chael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval, and the FDA New Drug Screening Process, 3 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 310-313, 323. (2000). Technically, the clinical outcome of interest 
is “survival,” but for statistical purposes, the endpoint is considered to be mortality. See Katz, supra note 
21, at 191. 
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Act (FDAMA).43  Sponsors may request “fast track” designation, when or 
after they submit the initial IND, for drugs “intended for the treatment of a 
serious or life-threatening condition” and that “demonstrate the potential to 
address unmet medical needs for such a condition.”44  If the FDA desig-
nates the drug as a fast track product, it must “facilitate the development 
and expedite the review of such drug.”45  Using language that closely re-
sembles that of Subpart H, the Act permits the FDA to approve a fast track 
product based on the drug’s impact on a surrogate variable.46  In addition to 
enacting the fast track provision in FDAMA, Congress amended the FDCA 
through FDAMA to clarify that the FDA may rely on “data from one ade-
quate and well-controlled clinical investigation and confirmatory evidence” 
to find substantial evidence of a drug’s efficacy.47 
More recently, on July 9, 2012, Congress enacted the Food and Drug 
Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA), which, among other 
things, adds new mechanisms for fostering and speeding the development 
of therapies for drugs for serious or life-threatening conditions. 48  Under 
the “breakthrough therapy” amendment, the FDA may designate a drug or a 
new drug use as a “breakthrough therapy” if it is “intended…to treat a seri-
ous or life-threatening disease or condition” and if “preliminary clinical 
evidence indicates that the drug may demonstrate substantial improvement 
over existing therapies.”  Breakthrough and fast track designation, although 
similar, are distinct and may separately be pursued.49  Once designated as a 
breakthrough therapy, the drug would enjoy all the benefits of fast track 
designation and should receive even closer guidance by the FDA.50 
                                                                                                                           
 43. Rossen, supra note 2, at 191.  According to the FDA, the fast track amendment “essentially 
codifies…FDA’s accelerated approval regulations.” FDA, Guidance, supra note 2, at 27. 
 44. 21 U.S.C.A. § 356(b) (2012). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See § 356 (1997).  As currently amended, this provision is not limited to fast track products but 
more generally to those intended to treat a “serious or life-threatening disease or condition, including a 
fast track product.” § 506(c)(1)(a) (2012). 
 47. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(d) (2013). This is an amendment to the section defining “substantial 
evidence.” 
 48. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, 126 Stat. 993 
(2012). 
 49. According to the FDA, the primary difference lies in “what needs to be demonstrated” to 
obtain the designation.  Fast track designation simply requires that the drug “demonstrate the potential to 
address unmet medical needs for the serious condition,” which may be shown with nonclinical data, 
while a breakthrough designation requires “preliminary clinical evidence” of a “substantial improve-
ment … over existing therapies.”  FDA, Frequently Asked Questions: Breakthrough Therapies, (Sept. 
11, 2014), See also 21 U.S.C. §§ 356(a)-(c) (2012). 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/FederalFoodDrugandCosmeticActFDCAct/Sign
ificantAmendmentstotheFDCAct/FDASIA/ucm341027.htm. 
 50. Id. (“A breakthrough therapy designation conveys all of the fast track program features… [as 
well as] more intensive FDA guidance on an efficient drug development program”)  See also 21 U.S.C. 
§ 356(a)-(b) (2012). 21 U.S.C. § 356(a)(3) (2012) (The statute requires that the FDA “take such actions 
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B. The “Same Statutory Standard” 
Given these reforms, it may appear that the evidentiary standards now 
depend, in part, on the need for the drug.51  Critically, however, the “sub-
stantial evidence” requirement still legally applies in full force to all new 
drug candidates.52  Even though it amended the section defining “substan-
tial evidence” in FDAMA, Congress never actually compromised the true 
meaning of “substantial evidence.”53  Also, although the stated purpose of 
FDASIA is to “encourage the [FDA] to utilize innovative and flexible ap-
proaches” in evaluating the evidence for drugs intended to treat serious or 
life-threatening diseases,54 Congress explicitly maintains that the “substan-
tial evidence” requirement remains unchanged, and that the same standard 
continues to apply to drugs that qualify for fast track designation, break-
through designation, or accelerated approval.55 
Even if it could be argued that the standards were altered, the reform 
measures at most merely allow the FDA to apply this reduced standard, but 
do not explicitly require it to do so.  The FDA is simply “required to exer-
                                                                                                                           
as are appropriate to expedite the development and review,” where such actions “may include” that of 
“holding meetings,” giving “timely advice,” or providing a “collaborative” review). 
 51. In particular, Subpart H and the fast track legislation allow the FDA to accept what epidemiol-
ogists call “unvalidated” surrogate endpoints, where it has not been scientifically established that the 
drug’s effect on the surrogate predicts its effect on the clinical endpoint.  Katz, supra note 21, at 190 
(defining an “unvalidated surrogate” as “a surrogate that is, as the regulation describes, ‘reasonably 
likely’ to predict the clinical benefit of interest, but for which there is insufficient evidence to establish 
that such an effect, does, in fact, result in the desired clinical outcome”).  The FDA actually does not 
need to refer to Subpart H to recognize “validated” endpoints, where the predictive relationship is fairly 
established according to the scientific community. Id. See also FDA, Guidance, supra 20, at 11 (stating, 
“A pharmacologic effect that is accepted as a validated surrogate endpoint can support ordinary approv-
al …[while] a pharmacologic effect that is considered reasonably likely to predict clinical benefit can 
support accelerated approval”) (italics added).  The problem with relying on an unvalidated surrogate is 
that it may become evident after approval that the drug’s effect on the surrogate does not adequately 
predict the effect on the clinical endpoint. Greenberg, supra note 42, at 323-24. 
 52. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c) (2014). 
 53. See Kulynych, supra note 7, at 146. Congress purposefully wrote the single-study provision in 
“permissive” language, rejecting industry proposals for a presumptive standard for qualifying drugs.  
The amendment rather served as a clarification that one study could satisfy the substantial evidence 
requirement. In the text of the Act, Congress entitled the specific amendment as “Clarification of the 
Number of Required Clinical Investigations for Approval.” See also FDAMA, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 
Stat. 2313 (1997); FDA, Guidance, supra note 20, at 4. (The FDA also characterizes it as a mere “clari-
fication”). 
 54. 21 U.S.C.A. § 356(e)(1) (2012) (italics added). 
 55. See 21 U.S.C. § 356(e)(2) (2012).  The FDA similarly comments that the fast track and break-
through therapy provisions do not alter the evidentiary standards, going further to state that it “has been 
vigilant in assuring that reducing the time necessary for drug development has not compromised the 
safety and effectiveness of drugs for patients with serious diseases.” FDA, Fast Track, Breakthrough 
Therapy, Accelerated Approval and Priority Review: Expediting Availability of New Drugs for Patients 
with Serious Conditions, (May 30, 2014), 
http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/forpatientadvocates/speedingaccesstoimportantnewtherap
ies/ucm128291.htm. 
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cise its scientific judgment” to determine the requirements for each “partic-
ular drug to meet the statutory standards.”56 Rather than officially tailor the 
evidentiary standards to the need for the drug, Congress instead confirmed 
the FDA’s discretion to do so on a case-by-case basis. 
That the FDA wishes to maintain this approach of flexibility, without an-
nouncing any reduced standard, is perhaps even more obvious.  In the past 
few decades, the FDA revealed not only a belief in its authority to exercise 
significant case-by-case flexibility, but a marked hesitancy to give any indi-
cation of when it would likely exercise this flexibility. For instance, the 
FDA clearly believed that it has the authority to approve AZT prior to pass-
ing Subpart E, and it only later passed it reluctantly in response to pressure 
from the executive branch.57 
Also, although the FDA issued a guidance document in 1998 that was 
meant to clarify its standards,58 the guidance actually reveals the FDA’s 
desire to maintain an approach of case-by-case flexibility and a relatively 
conservative image on paper.59  It strongly emphasizes the importance of 
the gold standard,60 and it narrowly describes study characteristics that 
“could” support a single-study approval.61  However, no single characteris-
tic is “necessarily determinative,” and, in the end, the FDA’s decision to 
approve a drug based on a single trial is “inevitably a matter of judg-
ment.”62 
PART II. CASE-BY-CASE FLEXIBILITY: THE UNOFFICIAL REFORM 
1. Increased Case-by-Case Flexibility 
Therefore, throughout all of these reform measures, both Congress and 
the FDA revealed a willingness to address the secondary harms of the “sub-
                                                                                                                           
 56. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c) (2014). 
 57. Leibfarth, supra note 1, at 1290 (stating that the FDA promulgated Subpart E “[i]n response” 
to the Vice President’s request); Messner, supra note 33, at 11.  More generally, see id. at 22 (claiming 
that the “the sliding standards for NDA approval continue to be a moving target, judged in practice on a 
case-by-case basis”). 
 58. FDA, Guidance, supra note 20, at 2. The stated purpose is more generally to “articulate [the 
FDA’s] current thinking concerning the quantitative and qualitative standards for demonstrating effec-
tiveness of drugs and biologics.” 
 59. See Messner, supra note 33, at 23 (stating that the FDAMA, in requiring the FDA to issue the 
guidance, “seems to have put the FDA in the uncomfortable position of discouraging single-study trials 
even while they advised on how to design them”). 
 60. See FDA, Guidance, supra note 20, at 4-5 (discussing in detail the possibility of error arising 
from “unanticipated, undetected, systematic biases,” chance, etc., if reliance is made on a single study 
alone). 
 61. Id. at 6, 13-15. Examples of such characteristics are a demonstration of “consistency across 
key patient subsets,” use of a factorial design, and a finding an association with a very low p-value. 
 62. Id. at 13, 15. 
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stantial evidence” requirement, but a reluctance to openly assert any com-
promise to it, even with regard to critically-needed drugs. 
However, in practice, the FDA itself seems to recognize that the face-
value of the reforms are not enough, and that it is necessary to truly tailor 
the evidentiary requirements to the need for the drug.  Perhaps the most 
remarkable demonstration of the FDA’s flexibility comes from cases of 
orphan drug approvals.  Although the FDA maintains that orphan drugs are 
subject to same standard of efficacy, possibly with an exception of allowing 
smaller sample sizes,63 a few recent studies show that the FDA often applies 
highly liberal standards to orphan drug approvals.  For instance, Kesselheim 
et al. analyzed the “pivotal trials,” or those that give the primary support for 
an NDA, for the 27 cancer drugs the FDA approved from 2004 to 2010, and 
found that 30% of the pivotal trials for the orphan drugs were randomized, 
as opposed to 80% of those for non-orphan drugs.64  In another study on 
drugs for neurological diseases, every non-orphan drug in the sample were 
approved based on at least two double-blinded, placebo-controlled RCTS, 
while only 32% of orphan drugs were approved with two such trials, and 
26% without even one.65 
However, the most striking evidence comes from a detailed report pub-
lished by the National Organization for Rare Disorders (NORD) in 2011.  
The report discusses the evidence the FDA relied on for the 135 non-cancer 
orphan drugs approvals it made from 1983 to June 30, 2010.66  NORD di-
vided the approvals into three categories based on the “quantum of effec-
tiveness evidence” required.  45 fell under the first category for “conven-
tional or traditional quantum of evidence.”67  32 fell under the “administra-
tive flexibility” category, where a deviation from the conventional standard 
                                                                                                                           
 63. For instance, the FDA stated in a briefing document in 2010 that “the requirements to establish 
effectiveness are not different [for orphan diseases], with the exception that the overall database may be 
smaller,” and that the FDA “usually requires more than one trial to provide independent substantiation 
of efficacy.” According to Sasinowski, this is how the FDA usually responses when it is “asked about 
the quantity and quality of effectiveness evidence required of an orphan drug.” See also Frank J. 
Sasinowski, National Organization for Rare Disorders, Quantum of Effectiveness Evidence in FDA’s 
Approval of Orphan Drugs: Cataloguing FDA’s Flexibility in Regulating Therapies for Persons with 
Rare Disorders, at 4 (2011), 
https://www.rarediseases.org/docs/policy/NORDstudyofFDAapprovaloforphandrugs.pdf. (citing FDA 
Pulmonary-Allergy Drugs Advisory Committee Division Memorandum, Feb. 12, 2010, at 15-16). 
 64. Id. at 2325.  Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Characteristics of Clinical Trials to Support Approval 
of Orphan vs. Nonorphan Drugs for Cancer, 305 JAMA 2320, 2324 (2011). Overall, the efficacy evi-
dence supporting approval for orphan cancer drugs is “limited.”  Id. at 2325. 
 65. J. Misumoto et al., Pivotal Studies of Orphan Drugs Approved for Neurological Diseases, 66 
ANN NEUROL. 184, 184 (2009). 
 66. Sasinowski, supra note 63, at 2. 
 67. Id. at 2-3. NORD defined this as approvals supported by “two adequate and well controlled tri-
als when each [met] its primary endpoint by its prespecified primary analysis with a p value of less than 
0.05.” 
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could be explained by “some formal FDA system for exercising discre-
tion.”68  Finally, 58 fell under what NORD called the “case-by-case flexibil-
ity” category, where the deviations from the traditional standard could not 
be fully explained by a “formal exception.” 
Several of the approvals within this third category reveal a level of flexi-
bility that perhaps may surprise anyone in the industry who is familiar with 
the rigors of the typical “gold standard” requirements.  The FDA appears to 
have approved several drugs without the benefit of a truly controlled 
study.69   Some pivotal trials failed to achieve statistical significance; some 
contained serious design defects; and some were based on extremely sparse 
or problematic data.70 The single-study approvals are further remarkable 
because the FDA asserts that, if it were to rely on a single study, it “pre-
sume[s]…that the possibility of bias due to baseline imbalance, unblinding, 
post-hoc changes in analysis, or other factors is judged to be minimal,” and 
that “reliance on a single study … leaves little room for study imperfec-
tions.”71  However, not only do many of these approvals contain instances 
of baseline imbalance, unblinding, post-hoc changes in analysis, and other 
negative study characteristics, many arguably do not even have a single 
“adequate and well-controlled” study.72 
2. The FDA’s Unpredictability 
However, it does not follow from these select stories that orphan status or 
the severity of the illness necessarily predict a lowered standard, nor how 
reduced the standard may be if it did apply.  According to a recent study, 
about 73% of non-orphan oncology drugs and nearly one half of orphan 
oncology drugs approved from 1995 to 2008 were supported by Phase III 
trials.73 In a 2011 report to the National Institute of Health (NIH),74  the 
IOM Committee stated that the evidence the FDA relied on for orphan 
                                                                                                                           
 68. Id. at 3. The sources of the “formal, expressed FDA system[s] for flexibility” included 1) the 
1998 FDA Guidance, 2) Subpart H, and 3) the provision in the FDAMA for approval based on “one 
adequate and well-controlled” study. 
 69. See. Id. at 16. (noting that the FDA approved Panhematin based on 6 small open-label studies 
which did not have concurrent controls and did not appear to have historical controls).  For other strik-
ing examples, see Appendix A. 
 70. See Appendix A for descriptions of select drug approvals included in the NORD report. 
 71. FDA, Guidance, supra note 20, at 6. 
 72. See Appendix A. 
 73. See IOM, Regulatory Framework for Drugs for Rare Diseases, RARE DISEASES AND ORPHAN 
PRODUCTS: ACCELERATING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, 96. (citing Richey et al. Accelerated Ap-
proval of Cancer Drugs: Improved Access to Therapeutic Breakthroughs or Early Release of Unsafe 
and ineffective Drugs? 27 JOURNAL OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 4398, 4398-4405 (2009)). 
 74. See IOM, Summary, RARE DISEASES AND ORPHAN PRODUCTS: ACCELERATING RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT, at 1-2 (2011).  The IOM Committee composed this report pursuant to an NIH 
request for a study on the “opportunities for and obstacles to the development of drugs and medical 
devices to treat rare diseases.” 
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drugs exhibited “considerable variability” and acknowledged “concerns 
about the consistency of judgments across review divisions of CDER.”75  
Accordingly, the Committee recommended that the FDA “promot[e] pre-
dictability, consistency, and reasoned flexibility in the regulatory process 
within and across its review units.”76  Scholars and the industry are also 
keenly aware of the FDA’s inconsistency, calling for greater predictability 
to aid in the development of important therapies.77 
The complicated story about one particular drug clearly illustrates this 
unpredictability.  The FDA approved Iplex (mecasermin rinfabate recombi-
nant) in 2005 for the treatment of growth hormone insensitivity syndrome, 
based on one, non-randomized, open-label prospective study on 36 sub-
jects.78  The open-label study merely compared the effects of two different 
doses of the drug on height velocity, without the benefit of a concurrent 
control group and without the benefit of randomization.  The study also 
failed to produce reliable safety data.79 
The story becomes more puzzling when it later appeared that Iplex might 
be effective in the treatment of the highly fatal neurodegenerative disease, 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS).80  The drug was already being used for 
treatment of ALS in Italy.81  However, Iplex’s sponsor took the drug off the 
U.S. market in 2007, pursuant to a patent settlement agreement.82  There-
                                                                                                                           
 75. IOM, Regulatory Framework, supra note 73, at 95-96. 
 76. Id. at 97. 
 77. See Radcliffe S. BIO (Biotechnology Industry Organization), Statement to IOM Committee on 
Accelerating Rare Diseases Research and Orphan Product Development, November 23, 2009, available 
at http://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/20091123_0.pdf, (calling for, among other things, “greater 
consistency among FDA’s review divisions,” in order that the company many better meet the unmet 
needs of patients with rare diseases); Kulynych, supra note 7, at 136-7 (recognizing the criticism that the 
“agency inconsistently applies the effectiveness provision of the 1962 Drug Amendments”). 
 78. Sasinowski, supra note 63, at 19. 
 79. James Gebert, FDA, Statistical Review and Evaluation: Iplex, NDA no. 21884 at 14 (July 12, 
2005), 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2005/021884_s000_Iplex_Statr.pdf  (noting that he 
“could not perform a “statistical evaluation of safety” because of the lack of a control group, leaving it 
to “clinical judgment to evaluate the safety” of Iplex).   The FDA’s acceptance of weak or nonexistent 
safety data may be surprising, not merely because growth hormone insensitivity syndrome is not life-
threatening, but because of the enormous potential for off-label use. 
 80. See E. J. Sorenson et al., Subcutaneous IGF-1 is Not Beneficial in 2-year ALS Trial, 71 
NEUROLOGY 1770, 1770-1775 (2008); See also Amy Harmon, Fighting for a Last Chance at Life, N.Y. 
Times, May 16, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/health/policy/17untested.html?_r=2. 
 81. Jamie Talan, FDA Approves Compassionate Use of Growth Factor Therapy for ALS: Special-
ists Say Evidence to Support Its Use is Weak, 9 NEUROLOGY TODAY 5, 5 (2009), available at 
http://www.aan.com/elibrary/neurologytoday/?event=home.showArticle&id=ovid.com:/bib/ovftdb/0013
2985-200905040-00004. 
 82. Id. at 6. 
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fore, patients could not obtain the drug through off-label prescriptions but 
had to request the FDA for a treatment IND.83 
What followed was a bitter battle between the FDA and terminally ill pa-
tients for access to the treatment IND’s.  The FDA initially denied the re-
quests, citing concerns about lack of data on safety and efficacy.84  Howev-
er, existing studies had not reported serious safety concerns,85 and the initial 
efficacy evidence that the FDA faced was weak, but mixed.86  Eventually, 
the FDA decided to deny individuals access to treatment IND’s for applica-
tions postmarked after March 6, 2009, citing a few failed trials.87  The fail-
ure of the clinical trials perhaps should not have been dispositive, as they 
suffered from a number of limitations and may not have been fully rele-
vant.88  Regardless, the drug was discontinued in 2009.89  While the effec-
                                                                                                                           
 83. Daniel J. Popeo, Op-Ed., If FDA Blocks Meds, How Will Government Health Care Work?  
WASH. EXAMINER, (Nov. 20, 2009), http://washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/2009/11/daniel-j-
popeo-if-fda-blocks-meds-how-will-government-health-care-work/33292. 
 84. Id; Talan, supra note 81, at 6. 
 85. The FDA admitted in a policy statement that the studies reported “no serious, immediate drug-
related toxicities.” Talan, supra note 81, at 6. 
 86. See infra, note 87. 
 87. See FDA Position on Allowing Patients with ALS Access to Iplex Under an IND, July 1, 2009 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/HealthProfessionals/ucm118121.htm . 
 88. See FDA, FDA Summary of Controlled Clinical Data for Human IGF-1 in Treatment of Pa-
tients with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/resourcesforyou/healthprofessionals/ucm118131.pdf . The FDA 
cited 5 studies to support its conclusion.  First, it is worth noting that the cited trials used human insulin-
like growth factor 1 (IGF-1), while Iplex employs a combination of IGF-1 and rhIGFBP-3.  Nonethe-
less, the FDA described IGF-1 as a “very similar drug” and considered the studies relevant.  Even ac-
cepting this, a close examination of cited studies reveals that the failures may not be as conclusive as 
they would initially appear to be.  In the first cited study, a U.S. study conducted in 1997, the group of 
patients receiving the higher dose (0.1 mg/kg/day) actually had a statistically significant reduction in 
disease symptom progression; however, since this was secondary analysis and since the study failed to 
meet its primary, prespecified objective, it was considered by the FDA to be a failure. See FDA, Sum-
mary on IGF-1 (citing Lai et al., Effect of Recombinant Human Insulin-Like Growth Factor-I on Pro-
gression of ALS: A placebo-Controlled Study, 49 NEUROLOGY 1621, 1621-30 (1997)).  A European 
study conducted on 124 patients reported no statistically significant difference.  However, not only did 
the study have low power, the sponsor noted that there was an imbalance of characteristics at baseline, 
with the experimental group happening to have poorer prognostic factors. See id.( citing G.D. Borasio, A 
Placebo-Controlled Trial of Insulin-Like Growth Factor-I in Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, 51 
NEUROLOGY 583, 583-586 (1998)).  This may have biased the results to the null.  The third cited study, 
also reporting no statistically significant effect, was a multi-center U.S. clinical trial conducted in 2008. 
See Sorenson et al., supra note 80.  However, Charles Howe commented that the study may have chosen 
the incorrect method of delivery of the drug, stating that “the concept of peripheral delivery of tolerable 
levels of IGF-1 is predestined to fail therapeutically” and that “it was premature to conclude” that the 
drug was not effective in the treatment of ALS. Charles L. Howe et al., Reply to: ‘Subcutaneous IGF-1 
is Not Beneficial in 2-year ALS Trial,’ 73 NEUROLOGY, (Feb. 23, 2009), 
http://www.neurology.org/content/71/22/1770/reply.  The fourth study was based on an analysis of 
treatment IND’s, rather than a randomized trial; and the final study was an unpublished foreign study, 
where the FDA was not even aware of the identity of the prespecified endpoint. See FDA Summary on 
IGF-1. 
 89. FDA, Access to Iplex for Patients with ALS (July 27, 2009), 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/HealthProfessionals/ucm118117.htm 
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tiveness of Iplex in the treatment of ALS may be an open question, this 
story demonstrates that the “quantum of evidence” that the FDA requires is 
highly unpredictable and that the intense need for a drug certainly cannot 
guarantee a lowered standard. 
Therefore, the approach of “case-by-case flexibility” remains unpredicta-
ble and perhaps, to a certain extent, unofficial. Although both Congress and 
the FDA implemented reforms that permit “accelerated approval” and 
acknowledge the FDA’s ability to engage in flexibility, the “substantial 
evidence” requirement officially remains untouched, and sponsors still can-
not be sure ahead of time that they will benefit from this flexibility. 
PART III: EXPANDED ACCESS AND THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT 
Rather than directly addressing the “substantial evidence” requirement, 
Congress instead chose to address the secondary harms of the “substantial 
evidence” requirement in two indirect ways.  One was to provide “expand-
ed access” to unapproved therapies; the other, to offer compensatory finan-
cial incentives through the Orphan Drug Act.   Each presents alternative 
means of addressing the two primary health-related costs of the “substantial 
evidence” requirement, delayed access and disincentives to development of 
critically-needed drugs. 90 However, for reasons discussed below, neither 
can be considered an equivalent to reforms that focus on evidentiary stand-
ards for approval. 
1. Expanded Access 
The FDA began an informal practice of selectively granting “expanded 
access” to unapproved drugs on an individualized, case-by-case basis soon 
after the 1962 amendments were passed.91  In 1987, reacting in part to the 
outcry from the AID’s crisis, the FDA passed regulations that formally rec-
ognized “Treatment IND’s,” 92 by which qualifying individuals may formal-
ly obtain expanded access to unapproved drugs that meet certain criteria 
and that are clearly on the path to approval.93  Later, Congress confirmed 
the FDA’s ability to grant such IND’s through a provision in FDAMA that 
closely mirrors the FDA’s treatment IND regulations.94  Under current law, 
the FDA may grant expanded access to unapproved drugs if it concludes 1) 
that the patient(s) “have a serious or immediately life-threatening disease or 
                                                                                                                           
 90. See Leibfarth, supra note 1, at 1287. 
 91. Rossen, supra note 2, at 193; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 315-6. 
 92. Rossen, supra note 2, at 193. 
 93. Greenberg, supra note 42, at 316. 
 94. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 360bbb(c)(1)-(4); Rossen, supra note 2, at 191 (stating that the relevant 
portion of the statute addressing treatment IND’s “parallels FDA’s treatment IND regulations”). 
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condition,” with no “comparable or satisfactory alternative therapy,”95 2) 
that the “potential patient benefit justifies the potential risks,”96 and 3) that 
the expanded access would not interfere with any clinical trials, or “other-
wise compromise the potential development of the expanded access use.”97 
By addressing the concern of delayed access, expanded access may oper-
ate as a partial solution to the problems raised by a lengthy, expensive drug 
approval process.  However, not only does it fail to address the concern of 
disincentives to development, it fails to adequately address the problem of 
delayed access.  Expanded access is unpredictable and unreliable, as it is 
largely falls under the discretion of the FDA,98  and it is often only available 
when sponsors are in the final stages of approval.99  Under the statute, the 
sponsor must be “actively pursuing marketing approval of the investiga-
tional drug … with due diligence.”100  To allow expanded access to an un-
approved drug for “widespread treatment use” under a “treatment IND,”101 
the sponsor must have either completed all necessary trials or be conducting 
a controlled trial at the time it provides such access.102 
Secondly, drug sponsors remain substantially disincentivized to partici-
pate in expanded access programs.”103  Although sponsors may seek limited 
                                                                                                                           
 95. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a)(1) (2014). See also 21 U.S.C.A. § 360bbb(b), (c)(1)-(2) for comparable 
requirements. 
 96. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a)(2). See also 21 U.S.C.A.§ 360bbb(b) (in the case of “individual pa-
tient” IND’s, requiring a physician finding that “the probable risk to the person from the investigational 
drug …is not greater than the probable risk from the disease or condition”). 
 97. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a)(3). 
 98. See Greenberg, supra note 42, at 320. 
 99. Id. 
 100. 21 U.S.C.A. § 360bbb(c)(4). The regulations apply the same requirement with respect to 
treatment IND’s only.  See 21 C.F.R. § 312.320 (2014).  This requirement does not exist for intermedi-
ate-sized, or single patient IND’s. In the case of single patient IND’s, Congress simply requires that the 
FDA “determine[]that provision of the investigational drug …will not interfere with the initiation, 
conduct, or completion of clinical investigations to support marketing approval.” § 360bbb (b)(3).  More 
liberally, FDA regulations simply require that it either make this determination or otherwise find that the 
expanded access would not “compromise the potential development of the expanded access use.” See 21 
C.F.R. § 312.305(a)(3) (2014). Presumably, intermediate-size IND’s fall out of the statute’s reach re-
garding treatment IND’s, as the regulations specifically permit access under this type of IND for drugs 
that are “not being developed.” See § 312.315. The statute requires that, not only sponsors be “actively 
pursuing marketing approval,” but that they at least be in the midst of a clinical trial in order for the 
FDA to allow expanded access through a treatment IND.  See 21 U.S.C.A. § 360bbb(c)(3).  The statute 
does not mention IND’s for “intermediate-size patient populations,” and the only seeming definitional 
difference in the regulations is that intermediate-size patient populations are “smaller than that typical of 
a treatment IND or treatment protocol.” See 21 C.F.R. § 312.315 (2014). 
 101. § 312.320; 21 U.S.C.A. §360bbb(c)(3).  The FDA may also grant “single-patient IND’s” for 
individual patients who are unable to obtain the drug through a treatment IND or clinical protocol, 
provided certain conditions are met. § 312.310.  See 21 U.S.C.A. § 360bbb(a) for similar requirements. 
The threshold conditions are relaxed for “emergency use.” See 21 C.F.R. § 312.310(d); 21 U.S.C.A. § 
360bbb(a).  It may also grant IND’s for “intermediate-sized patient populations,” even if all the re-
quirements for treatment IND’s may not be met. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.315. 
 102. 21 U.S.C.A. § 360bbb(c)(3). 
 103. See Rossen, supra note 8, at 216. 
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reimbursement for “direct costs” under certain conditions,104 the regulations 
define the term narrowly, and it probably does not capture all true financial 
direct costs.105  Furthermore, investigators must report adverse drug events 
to the sponsor, under any form of expanded access, and sponsors must in 
turn inform the FDA of this information through IND safety reports.106  
Such data may expose them to potential liability,107 and may affect the label 
or the probability of approval.108  In fact, the FDA explicitly stated that ex-
panded access data “can be useful to a drug’s safety assessment,” but that it 
is “very unlikely that an expanded access IND would yield [useful] effec-
tiveness information.”109  The sponsor therefore incurs the risk of acquiring 
adverse event data, which would likely be biased against the drug, but ac-
quires little or no benefit from the data.110 
Finally, expanded access often interferes with the approval process, as 
patients would prefer to access an experimental drug through a Treatment 
IND than through a clinical trial.111 Accordingly, it would not be in the in-
terest of drug sponsors who were conducting clinical trials to permit any 
delay in, or interference with, the clinical trial process.112  Especially as 
industry disincentives has always been a major, if not the primary, obstacle 
to expanded access,113 it is unlikely that treatment IND’s can be the ultimate 
answer to the problem of delayed access. 
                                                                                                                           
 104. See Leibfarth, supra note 1, at 1289 (noting that the section was meant to “eliminate[e] the 
economic disincentive”). 
 105. See Rossen, supra note 2, at 218.  See also id. at 217-218 (noting that biotechnology compa-
nies are often small start-ups that “face enormous pressure to complete clinical trials and obtain an 
approved product as quickly as possible” and are therefore in worse position to provide expanded access 
than more secure pharmaceutical companies). 
 106. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(4), (5) (2014); 74 Fed. Reg. 40905 (August 13, 2009). 
 107. Rossen, supra note 2, at 216. 
 108. See 74 Fed. Reg. 40905 (stating that “adverse events first identified during expanded access 
use of certain drugs have been included in the drugs’ approved product labeling”). 
 109. Id.  This is not necessarily true, at least in the case of orphan drugs. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, 
Institute of Medicine (IOM), Innovation and the Orphan Drug Act, 1983-2009: Regulatory and Clinical 
Characteristics of Approved Orphan Drugs, RARE DISEASES AND ORPHAN PRODUCTS: ACCELERATING 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, at 307 (The Nat’l Academies Press 2011) (finding that “[a] substantial 
number of pivotal efficacy trials for orphan drugs were open label”). 
 110. One cited comment, made during the notice-and-comment period for the proposed amend-
ments, noted that a sponsor providing expanded access “runs the risk of being adversely affected by 
unfavorable safety observations,” but receives “no commensurate benefit…from favorable efficacy 
observations in the expanded access population.” The commentator also noted that patients under ex-
panded access protocols will likely be often sicker or “otherwise not representative” of the clinical trial 
population. This should bias the data against the drug’s favor.  See 74 Fed. Reg. 40905. 
 111. Greenberg, supra note 42, at 319. 
 112. Id. at 319-320. One drug sponsor explained that it could not make its cancer therapy available 
on an expanded access basis because, “for every patient [it] took on a compassionate use basis, it would 
mean one less patient [it] could take in a clinical trial.”  Rossen, supra note 2, at 218 (citing a statement 
by Rick Harem, general counsel and vice president at Dendreon). 
 113. Id. at 217. 
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2.  The Orphan Drug Act 
Congress addressed the second harm, that of disincentives to develop-
ment of orphan therapies, by using a package of economic incentives 
through the Orphan Drug Act.  Congress passed the Act in 1983 based on 
the recognition that drugs indicated for rare conditions were highly unprof-
itable and that few were brought to market.114  To obtain the benefits of the 
Act, a sponsor must request the FDA to designate the drug as an “orphan” 
before it submits the NDA.115  An orphan drug must be indicated for a “rare 
disease or condition,” or one that impacts a patient population of under 
200,000 or that otherwise supports “no reasonable expectation” that costs 
would be recouped.116 
The Act operates by granting three primary benefits to designated orphan 
drugs. 117  First, sponsors receive a tax credit that covers 50% of clinical 
research costs.118 Secondly, they may receive some federal assistance, in the 
form of grants or funding to obtain contracts with public or private entities, 
for qualified clinical trial costs.119  Finally, and most importantly,120 if a 
designated orphan drug is approved, the sponsor would enjoy seven years 
of market exclusivity, or a guarantee that the FDA would not approve an-
other “such drug for such disease or condition” during that period.121 
The Act appeared to have some success, particularly in the years imme-
diately following its passage; however, the extent of its effect today is a 
matter of significant debate.122  Regardless, it cannot fully substitute for 
                                                                                                                           
 114. David Loughnot, Potential Interactions of the Orphan Drug Act and Pharmacogenomics: A 
Flood of Orphan Drugs and Abuses?, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 365, 367 (2005) (noting that, because the 
“increased complexity of the clinical trial process significantly increased the cost associated with bring-
ing a discovered drug to market,” drug sponsors “focused efforts on drugs that would have large markets 
waiting after clinical trials.”)  Many potential drugs for rare diseases were unpatentable, and it simply 
was not economically viable for a sponsor to take drugs for rare diseases through the entire, expensive 
approval process. David B. Clissold, Prescription for the Orphan Drug Act: The Impact of the FDA’s 
1992 Regulations and the Latest Congressional Proposals for Reform, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 125, 126 
(1995). 
 115. 21. U.S.C.A. § 360bb(a)(1). 
 116. § 360bb(a)(2). 
 117. David Rohde. The Orphan Drug Act: An Engine of Innovation? At What Cost?, 55 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 125, 128 (2000). 
 118. Id.; 26 U.S.C.A. § 45C. 
 119. Rohde, supra note 117, at 128 (citing 21 U.S.C.A. § 360ee). 
 120. Id. at 130 (“Of the three primary incentives incorporated in the Act, the most significant is the 
seven-year grant of market exclusivity”). 
 121. 21 U.S.C.A. § 360cc(a)(2) (West 2002). This is subject to the condition that, if it can be shown 
that the holder of the NDA “cannot assure the availability of sufficient quantities of the drug to meet the 
needs of persons with the disease or condition for which the drug was designated,” or if the holder 
consents, the drug may be subject to shared exclusivity. § 360cc(b)(2). 
 122. Rohde, supra note 117, at 142 (noting that “[t]en times the number of orphan products were 
approved in the decade following the Act than in the decade preceding Act,” but it is highly debated 
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reforms that address the evidentiary requirements.  For one, it does not ad-
dress the practical difficulties in acquiring “gold standard” data for orphan 
drugs.123  Orphan drug studies are often severely underpowered, due to the 
difficulty in acquiring a sufficient sample size.  If a study cannot acquire a 
sufficiently large sample, it may not be able to report a finding of statistical 
significance, even if the therapy has an actual effect.124  For extremely rare 
diseases, it is often nearly impossible to recruit enough patients to even use 
quantitative analysis; and some diseases affect fewer than ten people.125 
More fundamentally, the Act only crudely incentivizes the production of 
orphan drugs and results in significant unwanted consequences.126  If the 
Act’s goal was to compensate for economic disincentives for orphan drugs, 
it may have undershot and “mis-shot” in achieving this goal.  It may have 
mis-shot because the possibility for off-label use opens the door for poten-
tial misapplication of the Act, whether intentional or not.127  Because a drug 
may be used off-label for different indications, a sponsor may reap the ben-
efits of the Act by having the drug approved for an orphan indication but 
sold on a significantly wider market.128  On the other hand, if the relevant 
disease is truly rare and the potential for profit significantly small, market 
exclusivity would provide little additional incentive to market the drug.129 
Furthermore, sponsors face significant uncertainties as to whether they 
would be the first to obtain market exclusivity and as to what may qualify 
as the “same” drug under the Act.130  In short, in applying crude, general 
                                                                                                                           
whether the Act continues to efficiently incentivize orphan drug research, for numerous reasons).  For 
more information on the relevant concerns, see id. at 131-142, 
 123. Kesselheim et al., Characteristics, supra note 64, at 2321 (discussing the difficulties in con-
ducting controlled clinical trials on orphan populations). 
 124. IOM, Summary, supra note 73, at 1. 
 125. See id. (noting that some rare conditions have “reported cases in the single or low double 
digits”). 
 126. Rohde, supra note 117, at 131-132. 
 127. A drug manufacturer only need to prove efficacy with respect to “the conditions of use pre-
scribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling,” see 21 C.F.R. §514.4 (2014); however, doctors are 
free, and frequently do, prescribe drugs under different conditions of use and for completely different 
indications, see Michael J. Malinowski & Grant G. Gautreaux, All That Is Gold Does Not Glitter in 
Human Clinical Research: A Law-Policy Proposal to Brighten the Global “Gold Standard” for Drug 
Research and Development, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 185, 191-192 (2012). 
 128. Loughnot, supra note 114, at 370-1 (describing how several orphan drugs became “block-
buster drugs,” and noting that the method of “salami slicing,’ or using a subgroup of a larger disease as 
the orphan indication, is one of the major criticisms of the Orphan Drug Act”). 
 129. Dov Greenbaum, Incentivizing Pharmacogenomic Drug Development: How the FDA Can 
Overcome Early Missteps in Regulating Personalized Medicine, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 97, 124 (2008). 
 130. Clissold, supra note 114, at 131; Loughnot, supra note 114, at 376 (stating that, while the Act 
prohibits the FDA from granting market exclusivity for the “same” orphan drug designation during a 
protected period, “due to the complexity of the biochemical structure of most orphan drugs, the distinc-
tion between ‘same’ and ‘different’ became more uncertain.”); Rohde, supra note 117, at 134, 136 
(stating, “The risk of being locked out of the market after a substantial investment in, and the successful 
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economic incentives across the board, the Orphan Drug Act succeeds in 
partially incentivizing the development of orphan drugs, but fails to precise-
ly target critically-needed orphan therapies in a focused, dependable man-
ner. 
PART IV. CHALLENGING THE CURRENT EVIDENTIARY REGIME 
Therefore, the approaches that Congress and FDA have taken to address 
the unintended costs of the “substantial evidence” requirement, while miti-
gating the harms, fail to adequately restore incentives to develop critically-
needed drugs with high risk and low market potential.  Because the FDA’s 
flexibility is discretionary and unpredictable, the articulated “gold standard” 
approach still stands as a hurdle to the development of critically-needed 
drugs.  Case-by-case flexibility, expanded access, and the Orphan Drug Act 
are not enough; the FDA must act consistently and clarify that a reduced 
standard applies, at a minimum, to orphan drugs for serious or life-
threatening conditions. 
1. Challenging the Gold Standard 
First, the FDA should not require gold standard data for critically-needed 
drugs.   Although the “gold standard” may be theoretically ideal, what is 
ideal in theory is often not ideal in practice.131  Assuming certain assump-
tions are met, no other design compares to the blinded RCT in its ability to 
isolate the effect of the drug.132  However, RCT’s merely test the average 
effect of a drug across the trial participant population, and a finding of sta-
tistical significance says nothing about how the drug is effective, nor among 
                                                                                                                           
development of, an orphan drug is an unintended barrier to innovation not contemplated initially by the 
Act”). 
 131. See Evans, supra note 3, at 435 (admitting that RCTs “are correctly regarded as the highest-
quality evidence of drug efficacy,” if efficacy is defined as “how well a drug works for carefully chosen 
trial subjects in the ideal setting of a clinical trial,” because of its ability to eliminate biases….  but 
arguing that “that RCTs may not provide a complete picture of a drug’s effectiveness,” where effective-
ness is “how well it works in real patients in the actual health-care setting”). 
 132. In other words, an ideal study should minimize or eliminate the possibility of confounding or 
bias.  David Grimes & Kenneth Schulz, Bias and Causal Associations in Observational Research, 359 
LANCET 248, 249 (2002).  A “confounding factor” is any factor other than the intervention that differs 
between the two groups and can explain a difference in the outcome.  Id. at 249-50. Bias, more general-
ly, may be considered anything that “undermines the internal validity” of the study, such as selection 
bias and information bias.  Examples of biases include selection bias, where the treatment and control 
group are not comparable due to the method of selection, and differential information bias, where the 
exposure or outcome is misclassified or misrepresented based on the method of collecting information.  
Information bias goes beyond the well-known “placebo effect” but can include the bias of the observing 
clinicians in making subjective assessments, participant bias that can result from altered behaviors 
because of the knowledge of treatment, etc.  Id. at 248-49. Random assignment practically eliminates 
confounding and selection bias, and double-blinding practically eliminates information bias. See Evans, 
supra note 3, at 433. 
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whom.133  Often, a drug is effective only among patients with a certain 
characteristics, genetic or phenotypic.134  Therefore, it may be highly effec-
tive among a small subgroup in a trial, but the entire trial would be a failure 
if the average effect is not statistically significant.135 
Furthermore, data from RCT’s are not often generalizable, or translata-
ble, to the various uses and populations in the real world. 136  Aside from the 
fact that a significant portion of drug use is off-label,137 RCT’s are conduct-
ed on an artificially-defined population that is often healthier than the popu-
lation intended to receive the drug.138  With potential “wide gaps between 
clinical data and clinical use of pharmaceuticals,” the medical profession 
may have to rely on data from patient experience, which is exactly what 
pre-approval clinical trials are supposed to prevent.139 
Finally, RCT’s shed little light on safety.  In fact, Phase III trials do not 
specifically test for drug safety.140  For this reason, reports of successful 
Phase III trials may be misleading to consumers, and perhaps even doctors, 
for the supposition that the expensive trials are a powerful source of safety 
data.141 
Furthermore, with the dawn of personalized medicine and a myriad of 
other technological advances, the ability to reliably provide sound efficacy 
evidence outside of the gold standard is not merely becoming more of a 
reality, but, as some argue, a necessity.142   In 1962, drugs were, and still are 
to a large extent today, identified by a process of random screening.143  
Without a prior understanding of for whom and under what conditions the 
drug may be effective, it might have once been necessary to cast a broad net 
                                                                                                                           
 133. See Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Development, supra note 14, at 368-9 (criticizing the 
“gold standard” design for its “focus[]on ascertaining statistically significant variations based upon 
group averages,” which he argues is inappropriate in light of human variability). 
 134. Matthew Avery, Personalized Medicine and Rescuing “Unsafe” Drugs with Phar-
macogenomics: A Regulatory Perspective, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 37, 40 (2010). 
 135. Evans, supra note 3, at 468. 
 136. See id. at 446, 448. Generalizability is the extent to which study results can be applied to a 
population beyond that of the study. Id. at 448. 
 137. In fact, according to a recent (2000) study, most cancer and AIDS patients receive off-label 
drug therapy.  Malinowski & Gautreaux,supra note 127, at 191-92. 
 138. Evans, supra note 3, at 450. This is the not only for ethical and commercial reasons, id., but 
because researchers try to enhance the homogeneity of the study population to better isolate the effect of 
the drug. That is, if a diverse study population has multiple illnesses, it is more likely that even a ran-
domized study would suffer from “chance confounding.” See Grimes & Schulz, supra note 132, at 250. 
 139. Malinowski & Gautreaux,  supra note 127, at 194. 
 140. Based on an underlying principle of hypothesis testing, RCT’s must be designed to test for a 
prespecified endpoint.  Since drugs can cause numerous, unknown side effects, many which may not be 
detectable until later in life, it is virtually impossible to design an RCT that specifically tests for drug 
safety.  Evans, supra note 3, at 440-41. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See, e.g., Greenbaum, supra note 129, at 101-15. 
 143. See id. at 111 (observing that the classical method of drug identification is “somewhat 
stochastical,” and “random[]” ). 
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in a clinical trial.144  However, technological advances are better enabling 
researchers to engage in “rational drug design,” or the use of “genetic and 
molecular knowledge of the disease,” to identify compounds that target 
particular proteins or other biological products.145  In particular, the field of 
pharmacogenomics is becoming increasingly prominent, where scientists 
may identify “disease-causing genes…or their eventual protein product” as 
specific targets.146  This in turn is giving rise to a world of personalized 
medicine and targeted therapies.147 With rational drug design and targeted 
therapies, clinical trials are rendered less meaningful and useful.148 
Additionally, technological advances in recording, storing, and analyzing 
data increase the reliability of post-approval studies.149  In 1962, it was 
slow, costly, and cumbersome to record and analyze patient data in an ob-
servational study.  Today, however, it is possible to record minute details in 
large databases.150 
This increased ability to identify and control for confounding variables, 
along with more comprehensive data sets, narrows the gap between gold 
standard clinical trials and observational studies.151 
Granted, regardless of these improvements, observational data is far less 
verifiable and more incomplete than Phase III data,152 and post-approval 
studies can never be guaranteed to be free from bias.153  Also, while Phase 
III trials may not fit a regime of individualized medicine, personalized med-
icine is still in the early stages.154  Today, gold standard data has at least 
some value, but its value seems to be increasingly limited. 
                                                                                                                           
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 110. 
 147. See Leigh Ann Simmons et al., Personalized Medicine is More Than Genomic Medicine: 
Confusion Over Terminology Impedes Progress Towards Personalized Healthcare, 9 PERS. MED. J. 85, 
86–87 (2011) (defining “targeted therapies” as those “designed to impact specific metabolic components 
or pathways found to be responsible for a particular disease,” and personalized medicine more generally 
as “the application of personalized medicine tools…to components of patient care.”) 
 148. See Greenbaum, supra note 129, at 114. 
 149. See, e.g,. Andrew Grove, Rethinking Clinical Trials, 333 SCIENCE, SEPT. 23, 2011, 1679. 
 150. Id.; Evans, supra note 3, at 438-39. 
 151. See Grimes & Schulz, supra note 132, at 250 (noting that confounding can be “corrected, 
provided that confounding was anticipated and the requisite information gathered,” although it may not 
be possible to correct selection bias or information bias after the fact.) 
 152. D.W. Borhani & J.A. Butts, Rethinking Clinical Trials: Biology’s Mysteries, 334 SCIENCE 
1346, 1346–1347 (2011). 
 153. See Grimes & Schulz, supra note 132, at 250 (noting that selection and information bias result 
in “irreparable damage” to an observational study). 
 154. See Greenbaum, supra note 129, at 102. 
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2. Challenging the Application of the Gold Standard to Critically-Needed 
Drugs 
However, a separate, more fundamental objection to the “gold standard” 
approach can be made with respect to patients with serious illnesses.  Re-
gardless of what provides the best evidence of efficacy, there is less reason 
to require efficacy data for critically-needed drugs, at least when no compa-
rable therapy is available. 
Congress introduced the efficacy requirement largely for economic rea-
sons, to address the problem of drug companies’ “misleading and unsup-
ported claims” and unjustly high prices.155  In addition, pre-approval evi-
dence of efficacy may also increase safety.   Since every new drug comes 
with the risk of adverse effects, some argue that it would be unethical to 
distribute drugs without “valid statistical evidence of efficacy.”156 
However, the entire risk/benefit analysis is significantly different for pa-
tients who suffer from serious diseases.157  Delayed access may mean little 
to those seeking “lifestyle drugs,” but it may be a matter of life and death to 
those with a life-threatening illness. 158  The cost of the “substantial evi-
dence” requirement is further amplified if the disease is also an untreated 
orphan condition; the ultimate cost being that few or no drugs are devel-
oped. 
Not only are the costs of the “substantial evidence” requirement in-
creased, but the benefits are reduced.159  Safety is a relative term, and se-
verely ill patients who have exhausted all alternatives are clearly and under-
standably willing to take significant risks for any chance of hope.160  Simi-
larly, the value of efficacy data diminishes, because patients would be will-
ing to incur the risks of a new therapy with even the smallest chance of 
efficacy.161 
Finally, such patients are arguably in a better position, and may have a 
fundamental right, to decide whether and how they want to attempt to im-
prove their conditions or save their lives.162  Once it comes to a matter of 
                                                                                                                           
 155. Frederick Beckner, III, The FDA’s War on Drugs, 82 GEO. L.J. 529, 550-51.  See also Guid-
ance, supra note 20, at 2. 
 156. Borhani & Butts, supra note 152, at 1347. 
 157. Leibfarth, supra note 1, at 1288. 
 158. See Greenberg, supra note 42, at 315. 
 159. Id. at 296 (stating, “For a group of individuals facing imminent death…, the possibility that an 
experimental treatment could be unsafe or ineffective became largely irrelevant”). 
 160. Leibfarth, supra note 1, at 1288. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Hayes Edwards, Risky Business: How the FDA Overstepped Its Bounds by Limiting Pa-
tient Access to Experimental Drugs, 22 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 389, 393 (2012); Lois K. Perrin, The 
Catch-22 for Persons with AIDS: To Have or Not to Have Easy Access to Experimental Therapies and 
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life and death, the “value of scientific rigor may become secondary to the 
value of personal therapeutic choice.”163 This is particularly true in the case 
of orphan drugs for serious diseases.  It is one thing to argue for strong pre-
approval evidence if it simply meant a temporary delay to access, however; 
it makes little sense to require such evidence if it could mean that no drug 
would be developed.  Accordingly, the clearest case for a lowered standard 
for efficacy evidence is a drug indicated for a serious or life-threatening 
orphan condition.  The true cost of the gold standard is at its highest here, 
since the disincentives to drug production is higher in the case of orphan 
drugs, and the resulting harm is at its greatest. 
This does not necessarily mean the gold standard approach should be 
completely abolished.  However, the marginal benefits of gold standard 
data simply do not exceed its costs in the case of serious and life-
threatening illnesses.  Instead, a greater reliance on post-marketing studies 
may be more appropriate in these cases.164  Since early-phase data is gener-
ally more powerful today than in 1962, and since many new drugs for seri-
ous or life-threatening illnesses are targeted therapies, 165 early-phase data 
may be sufficient to release the drugs to these patients. 
PART V: THE EX ANTE PERSPECTIVE 
Nonetheless, it is not enough to convince the FDA that orphan drugs for 
serious or life-threatening diseases should be subject to lowered standards 
of approval because, as demonstrated by its approval history, the FDA may 
already recognize this to some degree.  However, it does not uniformly ap-
ply a lowered standard, nor does it offer a clear indication of when it will 
apply a reduced standard or what that might mean.  By taking this ap-
proach, the FDA fails to address one crucial component of the problem, ex 
ante disincentives. 
                                                                                                                           
Early Approval for New Drugs, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 105, 149 (1995) (claiming that patients with terminal 
illnesses have a “fundamental right” to choose what risks to take). 
 163. Id. at 150 ([A]rguing that any government interest should give way to the “value of personal 
therapeutic choice” for terminally ill patients because : “(1) The freedom to care for one’s health is of a 
highly personal nature that should ultimately rest with the individual; (2) a regulation denying access to 
unapproved drugs severely interferes with the lifestyle of the terminally ill individual; and (3) only the 
terminally ill person is affected by the decision to choose unapproved drugs”). 
 164. See Steven R. Salbu, The FDA and Public Access To New Drugs: Appropriate Levels of Scru-
tiny in the Wake of HIV, Aids, and the Diet Drug Debacle, 79 B.U. L. REV. 93, 143-50 (1999). 
 165. See Steven T. Walker, Should Congress Amend FDCA to Create Earlier Patient Access to 
New Treatments for Serious and Life-Threatening Conditions? FDLI’S FOOD AND DRUG POLICY 
FORUM, at 1 (Ap.11, 2011)., http://abigail-alliance.org/docs/FDLISteveWalker.pdf. 
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1. The Economic Perspective 
As in any other industry, pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies 
must compare expected revenue to expected cost before deciding whether 
to pursue a particular venture.  Given the nature of drug investments, it is 
critical that drug sponsors be able to make reasonable projections of these 
figures at an early point in time.166  Sponsors and investors use the concept 
of “net present value” (NPV) in their development and investment deci-
sions.167  Important factors that affect NPV include total cost, time, and the 
discount rate.  The discount rate, or the required return on investment, is 
critically affected by the risk of the investment.168  Estimations of total out-
lay, time, and risk are especially crucial in the drug development context.169 
A clarified reduction in evidentiary requirements should have the follow-
ing effects on the ex ante estimate of NPV.  First, it would reduce total ex-
pected direct costs.  Phase III trials account for as much as ninety percent 
(90%) of the development costs of drugs that are ultimately approved;170 
therefore, a simple expectation that Phase III trials would not be required 
should dramatically affect the NPV estimation.  Secondly, it would reduce 
the estimated time of approval. According to a recent study, it takes an av-
erage of 7.2 years to bring a drug from IND filing to eventual approval, and 
an average of almost nine years for neuropharmacologic and cancer 
drugs,171 in addition to 3 or more years of preclinical research prior to IND 
filing.172  Not only do longer trials incur higher accounting costs, the time 
                                                                                                                           
 166. See P. Honig & R. Lalonde, The Economics of Drug Development: A Grim Reality and a Role 
for Clinical Pharmacology, 87 CLIN PHARMACOL & THER. 247, 248 (2010), 
http://www.aacp.org/meetingsandevents/pastmeetings/Documents/Lalonde%20clpt2009298a.pdf 
 167. Id. at 248. 
 168. The classic equation for NPV include the following variables: the time of the cash flow (t), the 
total time (n), the discount rate (r), the net cash flow (Ct) and the initial capital outlay C0 . : 
NPV =∑ ஼೟ሺଵା௥ሻ೟௡௧ୀଵ െ	ܥ଴ 
The discount rate in this equation is “reflective of and significantly determined by the risk or probability 
of success (POS) of the project.” Id. 
 169. See id. (characterizing the “dominant concerns of the industry” as that of cost, time, and risk).  
See also J.A. DiMasi et al., Trends in Risks Associated With New Drug Development: Success Rates for 
Investigational Drugs, 87 CLIN PHARMACOL THER. 272, 272 (2010), 
http://www,readcube.com/articles/10.1038/clpt.2009.295 ( “Many factors affect the cost of drug devel-
opment, but two of the key basic elements are time and risk.”). 
 170. This data is based on findings from a recent study on development costs for drugs that are 
ultimately approved in four major areas of disease.  Phase III trials account for 40% of R&D expendi-
tures in general, but this figure is higher because it is based on drugs that are ultimately approved.  Roy, 
supra note 4, at 2. 
 171. The study was conducted on drugs approved in the period 2003-2007.  Critically, since these 
time periods measure the period since the IND filing, they do not include the period of preclinical test-
ing, discovery, and research. See Kenneth Kaitin, Deconstructing the Drug Development Process: The 
New Face of Innovation, 87 CLIN PHARMACOL THER. 356, 357-58 (2010), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2953249/. 
 172. Rossen, supra note 2, at 187. 
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value of money is particularly implicated in any investment with a signifi-
cant delay between the initial investment and eventual return.173  The ex-
pected time-to-approval component may be especially critical in the bio-
technology industry, given the time pressure from its heavy reliance on 
venture capital,174 and the FDA should note that reliably shortening the ex-
pected time-to-approval could markedly impact the development of im-
portant therapies in this sector. 
Another critical factor affecting the development decision is the antici-
pated risk.  A reduced evidentiary standard may or may not lower the prob-
ability of failure significantly, depending on exactly how the FDA applies 
the standard.  However, it clearly impacts the cost of failure, or the magni-
tude of the risk.  This cost is extremely high in the context of a decade-long 
development process.  According to a recent study, only sixteen percent 
(16%) of self-originating drugs were approved in the U.S. during the period 
1999-2004.175   Late-stage failure is particularly detrimental, as a significant 
amount of time and money had already been invested in the drug.176  Inves-
tors also face the risk of late-stage “economic failure,” which includes the 
risk that a sponsor will realize the market is overcrowded only after it is 
well into the clinical trial process.  On average, these decisions occur 3.7 
years after the beginning of clinical trials, when development costs are at 
the highest.177 
Accordingly, if an investment is characterized by high risk and high out-
lay, it may only be worth it if there is a chance of significant gain.  For this 
reason, rational drug developers often choose to develop “blockbuster ther-
apies,” or those targeted to large patient populations.178  On average, only 
thirty percent (30%) of new drugs are actually profitable; therefore, spon-
sors are particularly incentivized to aim for blockbuster drugs in hopes that 
one success would offset the other losses.179  Innovative, critically-needed 
drugs with low expected revenue and uncertain efficacy certainly do not fit 
this model.  However, by decreasing expected time and costs, a lowered 
                                                                                                                           
 173. Honig & Lalonde, supra note 166, at 248.  The concept behind the time value of money is that 
a given unit of money is valued more in the present than in the future. 
 174. Composed primarily of small, young companies with little assets, the industry relies heavily on 
venture capital financing, for the purpose of developing product and licensing them out. Accordingly, 
they “face enormous pressure to complete clinical trials and obtain an approved product as quickly as 
possible.” Rossen, supra note 2, at 217-18. 
 175. DiMasi, supra note 169, at 272. 
 176. Honig & Lalonde, supra note 166, at 249 (noting that late phase failures “incur tremendous 
direct, indirect, and opportunity costs, and serve to significantly destroy company valuations as well as 
erode the credibility of the R&D leadership in the eyes of investors”). 
 177. Kaitin, supra note 171, at 358. 
 178. Rossen, supra note 2, at 201. 
 179. Kaitin, supra note 171, at 356. 
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evidentiary standard would reduce the cost of failure and encourage the 
investment. 
Finally, predictability plays an important role in these economic deci-
sions.  It is important to note that the variables in the NPV equation are all 
ex ante estimates of expected value, and each estimate has a certain level of 
variance, or range of possible values, associated with it.  The narrower the 
range, the more confident an investor or sponsor would be of their projec-
tions. 
Case-by-case flexibility expands the range of possible estimates, but it 
does not reliably lower the cost estimate.  Given the FDA’s unpredictable 
approach, the possibility of high costs still remains, and will be seriously 
considered by pharmaceutical companies and investors.  The non-negligible 
possibility of having to conduct two large Phase III trials will be factored 
into the analysis and may act as a deal-breaker.  Accordingly, it is not 
enough to reduce the time or cost of a given trial; the FDA must more gen-
erally reduce reliable ex ante estimates of the expected time and cost. 
2. The Ex Ante Perspective of Current Reforms 
Therefore, a clarified reduction in evidentiary standards would accom-
plish what the existing reform measures could not.  For one, it would not 
carry many of the infirmities of the Orphan Drug Act.  Instead of over- and 
under-shooting, it directly targets a primary disincentivizing factor, the cost 
of the evidentiary standards.  If early approval is accompanied by restricted 
access, this would address the problem of misapplication of the Act for off-
label use.180  It would not impose the unintended side effects of market ex-
clusivity; and, financially, it would be essentially costless. 
Secondly, it would add the necessary piece of predictability to the FDA’s 
current approach.  Even if the FDA has recently been more open about the 
fact that it often exercises flexibility,181 it does not clearly say how it will, 
or even whether it will.  The FDA still reveals a significantly risk-averse 
                                                                                                                           
 180. See Roy, supra note 4, at 8 (advocating for a system of early “conditional approval [for] pa-
tients most in need” of the drug, which would permit a “modest amount of revenue”). 
 181. For each of the fiscal years 2011 and 2012, the FDA issued reports on the year’s “innovative 
drug approvals.”  The reports speaks positively of the scientific flexibility that the FDA exercised in the 
year’s approvals, and of its support for finding new, innovative means of assessing a drug’s safety and 
effectiveness.  In fact, the FDA explicitly notes that it “often allows non-traditional approaches to estab-
lishing safety and effectiveness” for orphan drugs, due to the “small numbers of patients who suffer 
from each disease.” See FDA, FY 2012 Innovative New Drug Approvals: Bringing Life-Saving Drugs to 
Patients Quickly and Efficiently, FDA.GOV, at 8 (Dec. 2012), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UCM330859.pdf.  In fact, 
the FDA explicitly notes that it “often allows non-traditional approaches to establishing safety and 
effectiveness” for orphan drugs, due to the “small numbers of patients who suffer from each disease.” 
Id. at 9. 
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side,182 and it appears to be sending mixed messages, likely due in part to a 
“divergence” within the agency.183 
Furthermore, neither vague statements of intentions, nor isolated reports 
of select cases of evidentiary flexibility, can reliably lower cost estimates.  
The FDA may be willing to announce its intention to “innovate” the drug 
approval process and provide “timely access to innovative and life-saving 
drugs.”184 However, such statements do not give a sponsor a solid indica-
tion whether a reduced standard will apply, to the extent practicable, nor 
what that might mean.185 
Admittedly, a lowered efficacy standard comes with its own costs.  Nei-
ther the FDA nor prescribing doctors would be as confident that the mar-
keted drugs are safe and effective. However, because the FDA already ex-
ercises flexibility in a significant number of cases, it is already imposing the 
“cost” of this approach on the public.  In other words, the patient population 
is already bearing the cost of reduced standards of efficacy in many cases, 
without the concomitant benefit of ex ante incentivization. Therefore, if the 
FDA is to apply a reduced standard anyway, it should announce this inten-
tion ahead of time to obtain the benefits of incentivization. 
This is also not to deny that the measures that Congress and the FDA 
took had any positive impact on ex ante incentives.186  However, they leave 
                                                                                                                           
 182. See e.g. Roy, supra note 4, at 9 (stating that “[t]he FDA is averse to all risk”); Henry I. Miller 
& David R. Henderson, The FDA’s Risky Risk-Aversion, POLICY REVIEW, no. 145 (Oct. 2, 2007), 
http://www.hoover.org/research/fdas-risky-risk-aversion (stating that “drug regulation in the United 
States in recent years has actually become progressively more risk-averse,” and referencing Genentech’s 
statement that the FDA arbitrarily delayed approval of the cancer drug Avastin). 
 183. Walker, supra note 165, at 4. 
 184. FDA, FY 2012, supra note 181, at 9. 
 185. See Sasinowski, supra note 63, at 5 (calling for a “statement from FDA as to how that flexibil-
ity finds expression”). 
 186. It should be noted that Congress took one measure that does focus on the predictability of 
evidentiary standards, although it cannot completely address ex ante concerns.  Under “special protocol 
assessment” provision of FDAMA, the FDA must meet with a sponsor who “makes a reasonable written 
request” to come to an “agreement on the design and size of clinical trials intended to form the primary 
basis of an effectiveness claim.”  If an agreement is reached, the FDA is bound to the agreement unless 
the sponsor agrees otherwise in writing, or if the director of the reviewing division determines “that a 
substantial scientific issue essential to determining the safety or effectiveness of the drug has been 
identified after the testing has begun.” See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(b).  However, the “special protocol as-
sessment” provision does not guarantee that an agreement would be reached. See FDA, Guidance for 
Industry: Special Protocol Assessment, FDA.GOV, at 2, (May 2002), 
www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/ucm080571.pdf  (noting, “If …the parties cannot agree that 
the trial design is adequate to meet the goals of the sponsor, the Agency will clearly state the reasons for 
the disagreement in a letter to the sponsor.”)  Also, the agreement would generally take place too late to 
impact early ex ante decisions, as the sponsor can only make the request as a part of the IND once the 
drug is in “advanced clinical development,” and once product characterization and the protocol are 
complete.  See id. at 2, 4-6. However, it can take about 3 years to acquire the preclinical data for an 
IND. See Rossen, supra note 2, at 187.  This would be far long after sponsor and investors make the 
initial cost-based decision to develop the therapy, the point at which cost estimates are crucial. 
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significant room for improvement.187  A proposal to change the evidentiary 
standards would not replace any of these reforms; rather, it would be com-
plementary.  In addition to the broad measures that Congress has already 
taken, a tailored efficacy requirement would more precisely, and powerful-
ly, incentivize the development of the most critically-needed drugs. 
3. Proposals 
How to specifically go about doing this is not an easy task.  Various pro-
posals have been made to strengthen expanded access, modernize the evi-
dentiary standards, or adjust the standards based on the need for the drug.  
Congress and the FDA can draw elements from these proposals to more 
precisely target ex ante incentives for critically-needed drugs. 
For instance, Steven Walker proposes that Congress amend the statutory 
definition of “substantial evidence” to take into account the severity of the 
disease.188  If Congress alters the definition to explicitly allow, or perhaps 
require, the FDA to take into account the need for the drug, it gives the 
FDA leeway to announce the lowered standards, without running afoul of 
statute.  The FDA then should, through regulations and guidances, clarify as 
much as practicable the reduced standard of efficacy for qualified drugs. 
However, given the concern for off-label use, and the concern that spon-
sors would have little incentive to pursue additional clinical studies, the 
FDA may choose to adjust this proposal by offering a type of provisional 
approval. Avik Roy proposes a system of “conditional approval” that would 
permit “limited marketing authorization” for drugs after Phase II to patients 
who most need it.189  The ability to reap marginal revenue can support fund-
ing for Phase III trial(s) and mitigate the risk that a “company would lose 
everything” if a Phase III trial fails or is not pursued.190  More dramatically, 
Andrew Grove proposes that the FDA only require Phase I safety data prior 
to marketing, and that a post-marketing “e-trial” system be utilized to estab-
lish efficacy.191 
                                                                                                                           
 187. See Honig & Lalonde, supra note 166, at 247 (recognizing the “remaining unmet medical 
needs in most all therapeutic areas”); Radcliffe, supra note 77 (claiming that “far too many patients with 
[rare] diseases still have no treatments”). 
 188. Specifically, he proposes that, instead of “adequate and well-controlled investigations,’ the text 
should read: “‘adequate scientific and medical investigation(s)’ that reasonably establish the safety and 
effectiveness of a new drug or treatment indication for its intended use, considering not only the risks 
and benefits of the drug, but also the risks posed by the disease and the adverse public health effect of 
delaying availability of a new treatment.” See Walker, supra note 165, at 7. 
 189. See Roy, supra note 4. 
 190. See id.(suggesting also that the FDA “retain[] the option to revoke that approval later on, 
should unexpected data come to light”). 
 191. See Grove, supra note 149, at 1679. 
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If Congress is unwilling to apply these proposals to all drugs, it may im-
plement a system of conditional approval tailored to the level of need.  
Along these lines, the proposed ACCESS Act would create a “three-tiered 
scheme” that ties the ability to access an early-stage drug to the severity of 
the need.192  The third tier would be equivalent to the current scheme, while 
the first tier would function as a more dependable version of expanded ac-
cess, allowing qualified terminally ill patients to access a drug based on 
Phase I data.193  However, the proposed Act envisions that the sponsor con-
tinue in clinical trials, as it must be “actively pursuing marketing approval 
with due diligence” to charge for the drug.194  This may be modified to al-
low sponsors the option to continue clinical trials, which would give the 
concomitant benefit of wider marketing opportunities, but allow adequate 
returns on an investment even at the first tier.  If the definition of “substan-
tial evidence” is amended, this multiple-tiered system may be modified to 
provide for early approval, rather than expanded access. 
Gleaning from these proposals, the FDA could provide one or more lev-
els of restricted, provisional approval and condition these upon agreements 
to conduct post-marketing stud(ies).  The model may allow for the option of 
Phase III studi(es) that would permit broader marketing requirements.  This 
ensures that, if a sponsor does not believe it is economically worthwhile to 
bring a drug through clinical trials, it may invest up to the “first tier.”  Ac-
cordingly, sponsors would receive adequate incentives to reach any “tier” 
of approval. 
Whatever the specific solution, Congress and the FDA should tailor the 
evidentiary standards to the need for the drug, clarify these standards as 
much as possible, and allow an economically-sustainable scheme of ap-
proval that supports it.  Granted, this clarification would be imperfect, and 
the FDA naturally would not be able to guarantee what specific types of 
evidence would necessarily qualify.   However, any added clarification 
should narrow the range of cost estimates.  At a minimum, a Congressional 
acknowledgement that a lowered standard of efficacy actually applies 
would have an enormous impact, not simply in assuring sponsors, but in 
giving the FDA license to clarify a lowered standard without having to 
make the difficult argument that “the same statutory standard” applies.  
Similarly, although the standards will undoubtedly go through some evolu-
tion, any added clarification through regulations and guidances would in-
                                                                                                                           
 192. See Leibfarth, supra note 1, at 1309 (citing Access, Compassion, Care, and Ethics for Serious-
ly Ill Patients Act, S. 1956, 109th Cong. (2005)). 
 193. Id. 
 194. See Compassionate Access Act of 2010, H.R. 4732, 111th Cong. (2010), at 11. The Act would 
also require that any patient accessing the drug have failed in an attempt to enter a clinical trial. See id. 
at 9. 
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crease predictability.  Although precise guarantees are impossible, the FDA 
should move in the direction of transparency and clarity. 
CONCLUSION 
The FDA must fulfill its statutory directive to ensure that any drug 
brought to the market is “safe and effective” for its intended use.  However, 
in doing so, it cannot forget its overarching goal, “to promote and protect 
the public health.”195  To best fulfill this goal, both Congress and the FDA 
must prioritize the incentivization of critically-needed drugs.  Through the 
existing reform measures, they have displayed a willingness to fight the 
unintended costs of “substantial evidence” requirement.  However, for the 
most part, they have done so from a current perspective, focusing on identi-
fiable drugs and identifiable costs.  To locate and target the hidden costs of 
undeveloped drugs, they must take a new perspective, an ex ante one.  
Case-by-case flexibility, expanded access, and the Orphan Drug Act may 
help, but they are not the answer.   Only by openly recognizing the relative 
value of “substantial evidence,” and by consistently applying a tailored 
standard, may the FDA truly fulfill a critical aspect of promoting the public 
health, delivering important new therapies to those who most need it. 
APPENDIX A 
Below is a list of examples of drug approvals that were included in the 
2011 NORD report. 
- 1983: The FDA approved Panhematin (hemin) to treat attacks 
caused by certain porphyria’s based on six small open-label studies.  Each 
had about twenty subjects; most lasted a few days; and none utilized con-
current controls.  As no data on the patients’ prior conditions had been pro-
vided, the studies did not appear to even have historical controls.196 
- 1985: The FDA approved Moctanin (monoctanoin) for dissolving 
gallstones in the bile duct based on published clinical data, animal and in 
vitro studies, and one multicenter study that involved no concurrent or his-
torical control group.  Both the published literature and the multicenter 
study reported success for only about a third of participants, and the pub-
lished literature also reported a “high incidence of adverse effects.”197 
                                                                                                                           
 195. See FDA, Advancing Regulatory Science for Public Health, October 2010, at 2, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RegulatoryScience/UCM228444.pdf  
(stating that the FDA’s agency’s “fundamental mission” is “to promote and protect the public health”); 
see also Leibfarth, supra note 1, at 1282. 
 196. Sasinowski, supra note 63, at 16. (NORD acknowledges the possibility that the FDA may have 
relied on poorly documented historical controls, although it could not find any reference to such con-
trols, nor could it ascertain whether any prior patient data was recorded or provided to the FDA.) 
 197. Id. at 20. 
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- 1989: The FDA approved Cytovene (ganciclovir sodium) for the 
treatment of cytomegalovirus retinitis in AIDs patients based on a retro-
spective case-series analysis of forty-one patients treated by the same phy-
sician, and analyzed in a post-hoc manner.198 
- 1995: The FDA approve WinRho (rho (D) immune globulin intra-
venous) for the treatment of immune thrombocytopenic purpura, based on 
four clinical trials that each failed to show a statistically significant im-
provement on any of the several employed endpoints.199 
- 1996: The FDA approved Cystadane (betaine HCL) for the treat-
ment of homocystinuria based solely on data from published literature and a 
double-blinded controlled trial that failed.200 
- 1997: The FDA approved sclerosol (sterile talc powder) based only 
on evidence from published literature. The designs of the various studies 
different in crucial aspects, from dose to the identity of the control group, 
and the statistical reviewer stated that it was impossible to determine how 
exactly the patients were treated.201 
- 1997: The FDA approved Antizol (fomepizole) to treat methanol or 
ethylene glycol poisoning, based on historical data and two small, open-
label studies that the medical and statistical reviewer described as “uncon-
trolled.”202 The statistical reviewer found the data unsuitable for statistical 
analysis and “inconclusive” because most patients in the treatment group 
were also treated with ethanol and/ or hemiodialysis. This made it nearly 
impossible to isolate Antizol’s effect from that of the other treatments.203 
- 1998: FDA approved Thalomid (thalidomide) based on an open-
label pivotal study that was uncontrolled and retrospective.204  The statisti-
cal reviewer claimed that “[v]irtually no adverse event data [were record-
ed,]” that the study was not “adequate [or] well-controlled,” and that “due 
to the total absence of any safety and adverse event data, no benefit to risk 
                                                                                                                           
 198. Id. at 16. 
 199. Id. at 21-22. 
 200. Id. at 12. 
 201. Id. at 23. 
 202. Id. at 15-16. (citing FDA, Statistical Review and Evaluation: Antizol, October 16, 1997, at 3-
4). 
 203. Id. at 16. (citing FDA, Statistical Review and Evaluation: Antizol, WWW.RAREDISEASES.ORG, 
at 4-5, Oct.16, 1997) 
https://www.rarediseases.org/docs/policy/NORDstudyofFDAapprovaloforphandrugs.pdf. 
 204. Id. at 23. The Statistical Review also mentioned another small controlled study, disregarding it 
as too small to support statistical analysis. See Brenda Vaughan, FDA, Statistical Review and Evalua-
tion: Thalidomide, NDA no. 20-785, at 1-2, (Jun. 16, 1997), 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/98/020785s000_Thalidomide_StatR.pdf. 
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evaluation [could] be made.”205  (This is the same thalidomide that gave rise 
to the 1962 drug amendments.206) 
- 2003: The FDA approved Aldurazymje (laronidase) for the treat-
ment of mucopolysaccharidosis-I, despite the fact that the single pivotal 
trial failed to have a statistically significant effect on one of the two pre-
specified primary endpoints and on three of the four pre-specified second-
ary endpoints.207 
- 2004: The FDA approved DTPA (diethylenatriamine pentaacetic 
acid) based on an uncontrolled, retrospective review of patient data in a 
government database, using rates of radiation elimination as the primary 
endpoint, and without the benefit of animal data.208 
- 2005: The FDA approved Revlimid (lenalidomide) based on a sin-
gle-armed, non-randomized pivotal trial that used same-patient data as 
nominal controls.  However, the method of selection suffered from severe 
design defects such that the controls were arguably meaningless.209 
- 2005: The FDA approved Exjade (deferasirox), relying mainly on a 
single non-inferiority trial that failed to meet the pre-specified non-
inferiority margin for the study population.  The FDA allowed the sponsor 
to engage in post-hoc subgroup analysis to achieve this margin for certain 
subgroups, an act that both the FDA and statistical community strongly 
frown upon as a form of “data-picking.”210 
                                                                                                                           
 205. Vaughan, supra note 204, at 36-37. 
 206. Aaron. S. Kesselheim & Daniel. H. Solomon, Incentives for Drug Development–The Curious 
Case of Colchicine, 362 N ENGL J MED 2045, 2046 (2010). 
 207. Sasinowski, supra note 63, at 17. 
 208. Drugs that treat severe or life-threatening effects of certain forms of toxic exposures may fall 
under a highly specific exception to the human efficacy data requirement, provided in 21 C.F.R. §314, 
Subpart I, given that such trials would be “unethical or unfeasible.”  However, Subpart I requires animal 
data, see § 314.610, but the FDA “did not require the sponsor to conduct such animal studies either pre- 
or post-approval” in this case. Id. at 15. 
 209. The sponsor claimed that it was able to use same-patient data as historical controls, comparing 
a treatment “success” of any 8-week period of transfusion dependence against a comparator 8-week 
period.  However, as NORD points out, the sponsor was able to select any eight-week period of transfu-
sion independence, in an unblinded fashion, as the “treatment period,” and compare it to the 8-week run-
in period that served as the control.  Given the inclusion criteria, the patient could not be transfusion-
independent during the comparator period; so the control period took place during a time in which it 
could not report a “success.” Id. at 18. 
 210. One of the fundamental tenants of statistical analysis is that the statistical criteria must be 
specified ahead of time; otherwise, it is possible to engage in “data picking” [or other phrase]. The 
statistical community severely criticizes post-hoc subgroup analysis because almost any study can 
achieve “statistical significance” for a particular subgroup, identified after the fact. For this reason, the 
FDA generally is extremely strict on this point, requiring a detailed statistical protocol ahead of time. 
See § 314.126(b)(1); see also Kulynych, supra note 7, at 142 (noting that the “FDA generally takes a 
dim view of post hoc “fishing” in data for subgroup effects, reflecting the traditional concern of statisti-
cians that post hoc data analysis artificially inflates statistical significance” and that “FDA will consider 
only effectiveness data that has been analyzed “in accordance with the plan prospectively stated in the 
protocol”). Id. at 15. 
